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外国語要旨

How do we appreciate fictional works?

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The purpose of this study is to explain what it is to appreciate fictional works, e. g. movies, literature, pictures, and comics.

We typically think that the distinction between non-fiction and fiction is fundamental, and use it to categorize works. However, the criterion of this distinction is indefinite. In other words, it is not clear that what is the peculiarity of fiction, so there is still room to investigate it. Hence, in philosophy of fiction, there are many arguments about what fiction is, and particularly in analytic aesthetics (analytic approaches to aesthetics), the peculiarity of fiction is investigated by explaining how we appreciate fictional works. Our appreciation of fictional works is thought to have the peculiarity which appreciation of non-fiction does not have, and that peculiarity is the criterion of the distinction between non-fiction and fiction. The peculiarity of appreciating fiction is, for example, considered to appear in seeing a movie. Before seeing a monster movie, we already know that what we are going to see is fictional, and the monster in the movie does not exist in actual world. Nevertheless, we are frightened by the monsters in fictional movies. What is important here is that, the situation that we have emotional responses to what we know that they are fictional (they do not exist) does not appear when we see non-fictional movies or real objects in daily life. This situation appears rationally only in our appreciation of fiction. From this point of view, the appreciation of fiction has the peculiarity which the appreciation of non-fiction does not have, so that there are many arguments which propose the criterion of fiction by explaining our appreciation of fiction.

In above arguments, the most widely accepted theory on philosophy of fiction is Walton's "make-believe" theory. Walton argues that we use a text or a picture of fictional works as props for the game of make-believe when we are appreciating fictional works, and this make-believe theory can explain not only our appreciation of literature but also appreciation of pictures and movies. However, there are many objections against Walton's argument, and among those objections, the theory which created a great sensation is Matravers's argument. Matravers argues that there is no significant difference between our appreciating fiction and our appreciating non-fiction. His theory is highly accepted that solves the problems of Walton's theory, and proposes unique view on the philosophy of fiction in that it argues that there is no significant peculiarity of appreciation of fiction. His solutions, however, do not fix all of the problems with fiction. In particular, it seems reasonable to think that the responses of appreciators who believe what they read is fiction will differ from those of appreciators who believe what they read is non-fiction. If there are differences in their emotional responses, then the appreciation differs too. I argue that Matravers's argument and other previous

arguments about fiction are not successful in this respect. The study of fiction in analytic philosophy began with the investigation of the property of fictional objects that “they have no denotation in actual world”, but not all aspects are explained by considering fiction as mere fabrications. Fictional works are made not only to be fabrications, but also to be appreciated for entertainment (or criticizing), and this is the most important aspect of fictional works.

From the above point of view, I focus on the appreciators’s awareness of what they appreciate is fiction. To explain the reason of why we have emotional responses to fictional objects without confusing reality with fiction, there are some recent studies that argue that our consciousness is separated in two during appreciating fiction. They claim that there are consciousness of accept the content of fictional works as real and consciousness of judging that it is fictional. These arguments have the advantage of being simple, but also have problems, namely the contradiction between believing in fictional objects and not believing in fictional objects. We cannot have the contradicted beliefs at the same time.

In this paper, I solve the above problem by the standpoint of mental functions, and propose the peculiarity of appreciating fictional works by explaining how we appreciate fiction. When we appreciate fictional works, not only our awareness of fiction but also our background knowledge of the fictional works are necessary. There are mental function of immersing ourselves in fiction, and also mental function of recognizing the background knowledge required to understand the context of the fictional works, and because these functions work together, we can appreciate fictional works. This theory can solve the problems of previous research, and explain the reason of difference of our attitude between when immersing ourselves in fiction and when criticizing the work. Moreover, I can propose the solution of the “paradox of fiction”, which is thought to be important and has long been debated in philosophy of fiction.