外 国 語 要 旨

学位論文題目　Person in Partial Control

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Background: Obligatory Control and Its Exceptions

Since Rosenbaum (1967), generative linguists have incessantly sought to discover underlying mechanisms of control observed in various languages. Control is a broad phenomenon that has been taken to involve some kind of referential dependency of one linguistic element on another. After Williams (1980), the classification of the phenomenon into two subtypes, obligatory control (OC) and non-obligatory control (NOC), has been widely accepted. The focus of the present thesis, complement control, is often subsumed under OC.

The definition of OC varies by linguist, but OC complement control, under a prevalent view, is said to hold when the reference of the null subject PRO of a nonfinite complement is identical to that of the predetermined argument (the controller) of the immediately higher clause. For instance, in the English sentence (1), the reference of the matrix subject *Ernie Banks* and that of PRO are identical at least in a pre-theoretical way; it represents a typical OC case.

(1) Ernie Banks$_i$ hopes PRO$_i$ to move to New York. (Morgan (1970))

However, since Landau (2000), attention to atypical or exceptional behaviors of complement control PRO has grown significantly. PRO and its alleged controller do not always refer to the same set of individuals. For example, (2) exhibits partial control in which the reference of PRO constitutes a superset of the reference of the matrix subject *The chair*. (3) allows control shift; the controller is not predetermined in the way presupposed for OC; the controller may be the subject or the object of the matrix clause. The same sentence, (3), also permits split control where the reference of PRO includes both the matrix subject and object reference sets. We find discussions dealing with these phenomena in the earlier literature on control, but they had long been treated as exceptions to OC, or sometimes subsumed under NOC.

(2) The chair$_i$ preferred PRO$_{i+}$ to meet at 6. (Landau (2000))

(3) Kim$_i$ proposed to Sandy$_j$ PRO$_{i/j/i+j}$ to do the dishes. (Rooryck (2000))

Implicit control, such as (4) below, also challenges the OC view of complement control. The controller is left implicit, or at least not pronounced. PRO is understood to refer to the agent of the matrix predicate *decide*. If OC assumes a syntactic representation of the controller and if implicit controllers lack such a representation, it would fall outside OC. In fact, implicit control is often subsumed under NOC.

(4) It was decided PRO to have dinner at 6. (Williams (1980))

We need a generalization beyond OC that would range over such broader scope of exceptional patterns of complement control.

Goal: Providing a Systematic Account for Exceptions – *De Se* and Partial Control

The present thesis aims at proposing a syntactic mechanism behind various complement control patterns that do not necessarily fall under the traditional view of OC. Towards this goal, first, I presuppose two types of OC proposed in Landau (2000): one is Exhaustive Control (EC) involving predicates including implicatives (e.g. *force* and *manage*) and aspectuals (e.g. *begin* and *finish*); the other is Partial Control (PC) typically associated with desiderative predicates such as *hope* and *prefer*. Crucially, PC allows *both* partial and exhaustive control while EC permits only exhaustive control. Interestingly, this divide is aligned with a cluster of other phenomena: PC permits control shift, split control, and implicit control, which constitute exceptions to the traditional OC, while EC allows none of these patterns (Landau (2015)). The duality of complement control is now widely accepted (Bianchi (2003), Grano (2012), Landau (2000 *et seq.*), Pearson (2013, 2016), Wurmbrand (2003)).

Second, this study pays special attention to the correlation between *de se* construals and partial control, a recent important discovery due to Landau (2015). In PC, a *de se* reading of PRO is obligatory; in EC, *de se* is non-obligatory. Why are the requirement for *de se* and availability of partial control connected in this way? Finding a solution to this question may lead us to a deeper understanding of PC structures. More concretely, the central puzzle for this thesis can be stated as (5).

(5) What are the common factors bringing about both *de se* and partial control?

The present study shows that a solution to (5) paves the way to a unified account for various OC exceptions including not only partial control, but also control shift, split control, and implicit control.

Proposal: Person and PC

This thesis argues that PC, the structure permitting both partial and exhaustive control, is reducible to the person system. I propose that *de se* construals and partial control observed for PC PRO derive from the same structural reasons that give rise to *de se* readings and *associative plurality* of the first and second person pronouns. The common factors shared by PC PRO and the first/second person pronouns are the notions of the speaker (or author) and the addressee, the primitives of person indexicals. These primitives are represented in the internal structure of PC PRO, the first/second

person pronouns, and some instances of the third person pronouns as in (6). This analysis builds on Harley and Ritter (2002) and Déchaine and Wiltschko (2002, 2009).

(6)



Sp=Speaker (Author), Ad=Addressee

Evidence for the connection between PC PRO and the speaker/addressee primitives comes from Japanese PC complements, in which a force independent from the matrix force is overtly expressed. Intriguingly, the relevant complement forces correspond to those with certain subject restrictions. Previous literature has shown that some forces such as imperative, promissive, and exhortative restrict the reference of the subject to be a certain set of individuals inclusive of the speaker or the addressee, or both (Nitta (1991), Hasegawa (2009, 2010)). Similar observations are made for Korean, for instance, by Pak (2004) and Zanuttini, Pak, and Portner (2012). The present proposal extends such assumptions to PC complements, and to languages beyond Japanese and Korean. In fact, the restriction on the imperative force that its subject must include the addressee is a well-known cross-linguistic phenomenon.

It will be proposed that *de se* interpretations of PC PRO and the first/second person pronouns are brought about by the movement of the PARTICIPANT element at Spec DP in (6) to the clausal CP domain above TP. This creates a self-ascriptive property out of the proposition denoting TP. The analysis is based on previous proposals on *de se* including Chierchia (1990) and Percus and Sauerland (2003ab). Importantly, I assume that the above-mentioned forces such as the imperative denote a self-ascriptive property, bringing about a *de se* (or *de te*) construal both in root and embedded environments. Such a view is in line with Portner (2004, 2007).

Furthermore, the present study adopts the analysis of Vassilieva (2005, 2008) on associative plurals. She assumes that the N head of associative plurals designates a non-descriptive human group. The associative plurality of the first/second person plural pronouns such as the English *we* and *you* arise from such a structure. The first/second person plurals do not refer to multiple speakers or addressees, but to a set of individuals inclusive of the speaker and/or the addressee. PC PRO bears a similar structure, allowing partial control. Control shift and split control as in (3) will also be accounted for by natural extensions of this analysis.

A crucial difference between PC PRO and the first/second person pronouns lies in the context against which their primitive speaker/addressee features are evaluated. While the primitives of the first/second person pronouns are indexed to the actual speech context, those of PC PRO are indexed to a reported speech, thought, or belief context. In this respect, PC PRO is comparable to shifted indexicals. The contrast in their morphologies, the zero-morphology of PC PRO and the overt forms of the first/second person pronouns, arise from the shift in contexts.

Nevertheless, this thesis argues that PC PRO is independently referential just as the first/second person pronouns are. Both PC PRO and the first/second person pronouns (in their canonical uses) are free variables with their semantic values assigned by the relevant context (Heim and Kratzer (1998), Heim (2008)). The reference of PC PRO and that of the alleged controller in the matrix clause often coincide, obeying the traditional OC definition. This is because the argument of the matrix clause often designates the speaker or the addressee of the shifted context. However, their referential identity is not a syntactic necessity. The current proposal denies the direct syntactic relation between the alleged controller and PC PRO. Their frequent overlaps in reference can be accounted for by the selectional properties of the matrix predicate. The predicate selects certain complement forces, which in turn restrict the subject reference to be inclusive of the speaker/addressee of the shifted context. Implicit control as in (4) receives a natural account under this proposal. This part of my proposal is a radical departure from the previous literature, but it constitutes one of the most important contentions of the present thesis.

Conclusion: Reducing PC to No Control

The proposal that PC is reducible to the person system amounts to saying that it is reducible to non-controlled structures. After all, in the current proposal, PC PRO is not *controlled* by the matrix argument. It behaves just like the first/second person pronouns, putting aside the contrast in contexts. The PARTICIPANT element of PC PRO in a way serves the role of the controller, determining its reference; the PARTICIPANT is also the source of the relevant forces and obligatory *de se* interpretations. The corresponding element within the first/second person pronouns plays similar roles in root contexts. Although analyses for EC are almost entirely left to future study, at least for PC, we do not seem to need a construction-specific theory of control. Even if EC turns out to be something that requires an independent theory of control, my proposal for PC does not lead to complication of the theory. PC is simply subsumed under no control.