@article{oai:teapot.lib.ocha.ac.jp:00039521,
 author = {山本, 麻衣子 and YAMAMOTO, Maiko},
 journal = {人間文化創成科学論叢},
 month = {Mar},
 note = {application/pdf, 紀要論文, We are inclined to think that an agent must have some intention when his bodily movement is an act. However, it is not easy to explain precisely what intention is.Thinking of intention as a judgement, as Davidson did, raises another question. What connection between one’s intention and his movement does it need for the movement to be an action? Davidson does not seem to succeed in solving it. C.Peacocke asserts that intention is a disposition. This allows one's intention to be connected logically with his movement. My intention (disposition) to do A implies that I will do A if some conditions are met. In this respect, it looks better than Davidson's theory. However, there are some differences between intention and disposition. 1) It is impossible that I fail to know what intention I have, but it is possible that I do not know what disposition I have. 2) One can have intention to do A in a proper sense or in an accidental sense. On the other hand, one cannot have disposition to do A in a proper sense nor in an accidental sense.In this paper, I showed that it is mistake to think of intention as a judgement or a d\
isposition.},
 pages = {51--58},
 title = {意図とは何か},
 volume = {11},
 year = {2009}
}