@article{oai:teapot.lib.ocha.ac.jp:00039592,
 author = {太田, 雅子 and OTA, Masako},
 journal = {人間文化創成科学論叢},
 month = {Mar},
 note = {application/pdf, 紀要論文, In order to vindicate the causality of the mental, the three principles "distinctness of the mental from the physical," "physical closure of causality," and "causal relevance of the mental" must hold coherently. However, one of the problems of mental causation is that these three principles contradict each other. According to David Robb, these principles can be reconciled by adopting the "trope theory" of property. The trope theory regards properties as "abstract particulars," and according to Robb, mental and physical properties differ in types, but mental tropes are identical with physical tropes. Mental properties as tropes can have causal relevance to physical events in virtue of this trope identity. Cynthia and Graham Macdonald criticize Robb's view by demonstrating that the question "why mental property qua mental can cause anything" ("qua" problem) cannot be answered by investigating the nature of tropes. In addition to Macdonalds' criticism, I show another kind of difficulty in applying trope theory to mental causation. Since tropes are the particulars, trope theory is incompatible with our conception o\
f causal explanation, which is essentially general.},
 pages = {153--160},
 title = {性質としての心の因果性},
 volume = {10},
 year = {2008}
}